Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
6-29-2015 12:00 AM

An fMRI Study of Command Following and Communication Using
Overt and Covert Motor Responses: Implications for Disorders of
Consciousness
Natalie R. Osborne, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Dr. Adrian Owen, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Science degree in
Psychology
© Natalie R. Osborne 2015

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Osborne, Natalie R., "An fMRI Study of Command Following and Communication Using Overt and Covert
Motor Responses: Implications for Disorders of Consciousness" (2015). Electronic Thesis and
Dissertation Repository. 3032.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/3032

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

AN FMRI STUDY OF COMMAND FOLLOWING AND COMMUNICATION USING
OVERT AND COVERT MOTOR RESPONSES: IMPLICATIONS FOR DISORDERS
OF CONSCIOUSNESS
(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Natalie Osborne

Graduate Program in Psychology

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

© Natalie Osborne, 2015

Abstract
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to explore neural mechanisms of
command following or communicating using executed or imagined movements, in order
to understand why most covertly aware patients cannot communicate. 15 healthy
participants executed or imagined arm movements that were either selected by them or
pre-determined. We also explored non-volitional motor activity by passively moving
participants. Response selection involved greater activity in high-level associative areas
in frontal and parietal regions than following commands. Furthermore, there was no
interaction between response and modality. Neural activity during passive movement
exceeded that of active (volitional) movement in sensorimotor regions. Our results
suggest that the ability to select between motor responses is not dependent on how that
response is expressed (via motor execution/imagery). They also suggest a potential neural
basis of the distinction in cognitive abilities seen in DOCs. Finally, passive movement
could be applied to study unresponsive patients’ motor systems.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.0 Disorders of Consciousness
1.1 Consciousness: Arousal and Awareness
Consciousness forms an integral part of the human experience, one that neuroscientists
and philosophers alike strive to understand more thoroughly. In the field of clinical
neurosciences, it is thought to be comprised of two factors: arousal and awareness
(Steven Laureys et al. 2004). Arousal in this case refers to wakefulness, which is
generated by the brainstem and reticular activating systems (McCormick & Bal 1997).
Awareness refers to mindfulness of the self or the environment, and is believed to arise
from regular functioning across and between brain systems (Steven Laureys et al. 2004).
The exact brain regions responsible for creating our conscious experience are not yet
known, although there are several theories involving thalamocortical (Schiff 2010; Schiff
2008; Fernández-Espejo et al. 2012; Monti et al. 2014) and fronto-parietal networks
(Noirhomme et al. 2010; Jin & Chung 2012; Fernández-Espejo et al. 2012).
Disorders of Consciousness (DOC) are defined as impairment to one or both of these
components, and consist of a spectrum of disorders including coma, the vegetative state
(VS), and minimally conscious state (MCS). This impairment is often caused by severe
brain injury, which may be traumatic (eg. motor vehicle accident) or non-traumatic (eg.
stroke, cardiac arrest, infection) in nature (Multi-Society Task Force on PVS 1994).
1.1.2 Coma
A comatose state is clinically defined as a complete lack of arousal and responsiveness,
in which patients are unable to be aroused by any external stimulation and lie with their
eyes closed (Steven Laureys et al. 2004). To be diagnosed as comatose, a person must be
in this state for at least one hour. After about two weeks to a month, comatose patients
who survive their acute injury typically begin to recover consciousness. However, some
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patients may recover wakefulness but remain in a disordered state of consciousness, such
as VS or MCS (Steven Laureys et al. 2004). Positron Emission Tomography (PET) is a
neuroimaging technique that measures brain activity as a function of the glucose
metabolized in brain tissue. Measurements of cerebral metabolism of glucose in coma
patients, which is believed to be an indicator of brain function, is typically reduced by 30
to 50 per cent of normal levels (Bergsneider et al. 2001).
1.1.3 Vegetative State
The VS is also known as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) because patients
have a circadian rhythm and sleep-wake cycles that lead to periods where they appear
awake with their eyes open, but are thought to remain unaware of themselves or their
environment (Steven Laureys et al. 2004). After one month in this condition, a patient is
considered to be in a “persistent” VS. The VS is considered to be “permanent”, and
therefore recovery of consciousness unlikely, after three months in patients with nontraumatic brain injuries, and one year in patients with traumatic injuries
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2012). While VS patients do not show volitional behaviour in
response to external stimuli, they can show several automatic, unconscious reactions
produced by the brainstem or limbic system, such as grimacing, crying, and laughing
(Steven Laureys et al. 2004).
Resting–state PET scans of VS patients reveal global cortical metabolism that is roughly
half that of healthy individuals (Rudolf et al. 1999). Metabolism is usually relatively
normal in lower brain areas including the brainstem, reticular system, hypothalamus and
basal forebrain (Laureys et al. 1999), which reflect VS patients’ intact autonomic activity
(eg, breathing) and wakefulness. Importantly, metabolism is impaired in higher
associative cortices (Laureys et al. 1999) that are thought to be required for more
complex cognitive functions including attention, memory and language.
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1.1.4 Minimally Conscious State
Patients in a MCS begin to show clear, reproducible evidence of consciousness.
However, this increased level of environmental and self-awareness is not stable, and
fluctuates over time (Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2012). Some of the behaviours that
characterize MCS are visual fixation and pursuit of objects, appropriate emotional
responses (eg. laughing at a joke), behavioural responses to verbal commands and
recovery of basic motor functions, such as manipulating objects (Vanhaudenhuyse et al.
2012). There is considerable variability in the degree of regained cognitive function
among patients in the MCS state, and individuals may emerge from this state or remain
MCS. Emergence from MCS (EMCS) occurs when a patient is able to communicate or
use objects reliably and accurately (Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2012). Interestingly, restingstate PET studies still show decreased cortical metabolism in MCS patients, with slightly
greater metabolism than in the VS (S Laureys et al. 2004).
1.1.5 Anatomical Features of DOC
The different profiles of brain damage that can result in a disorder of consciousness can
vary widely. Neuropathological and structural neuroimaging studies have revealed
diverse patterns of brain damage in this population (Adams et al. 2000; Kampfl et al.
1998; Juengling et al. 2005; Fernández-Espejo et al. 2011; Fernández-Espejo et al. 2012)
with damage profiles that seem to be unique to each patient. Subcortical damage can be
found in varying degrees and occasionally in isolation, while cortical damage can range
from severe to almost non-existent (Adams et al. 2000; Graham et al. 2005). The specific
origin of injury typically results in characteristic damage patterns. For example, strong
shearing forces experienced during physical trauma, such as a traffic collision, can sever
connective fibres and are particularly destructive to the brain’s white matter tracts. This is
known as Diffuse Axonal Injury, or DAI (Smith et al. 2003). Most traumatic DOC
patients show some degree of DAI and/or subcortical damage, specifically to the
thalamus and its white matter (Adams et al. 1999; Jennett et al. 2001; Fernández-Espejo
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et al. 2011; Fernández-Espejo et al. 2012; Fernández-Espejo et al. 2010). However, there
are currently no well-established structural “biomarkers” that can distinguish between
different DOCs (Fernández-Espejo et al. 2011). Therefore, the primary method for
diagnosis is bedside behavioural assessment, typically performed multiple times by the
patient’s clinical team.
1.2 Diagnosing DOCs
1.2.1 Behavioural Assessments
Measuring wakefulness in an individual is relatively straightforward, as people with
restored sleep/wake cycles typically have periods where their eyes are open and they
appear awake. Furthermore, electroencephalography (EEG) recordings can detect neural
activity patterns that are characteristic of sleeping and waking states in DOC patients (De
Biase et al. 2014). But how does one determine if someone (or something) is aware? The
most straightforward method is to ask for a response that indicates the person is aware of
themselves and their surroundings. Before the advent of neuroimaging techniques that
allow researchers to measure an individual’s brain activity, these responses were by
necessity behavioural. However, the absence of behavioural signs of awareness does not
necessarily equal an absence of consciousness (Monti et al. 2009). Figure 1 (Monti et al.
2009) provides a visual representation of DOCs and their relationship to the arousal,
awareness and behavioural components of consciousness.
Behavioural assessments rely on pre-determined and observable behaviours made by the
patient in response to certain visual, auditory and tactile stimulation administered by the
evaluator. The presence, or absence, of specific responses to these stimuli is used to make
inferences about the patient’s level of conscious awareness and cortical processing
(Schnakers 2012). These assessments include a variety of subscales designed to evaluate
everything from low-level reflexive responses to volitional command following and
communication. There are currently multiple behavioural assessments for consciousness
that are used in hospitals and primary care facilities throughout the world, including the
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Figure 1: Representation of different DOCs, including coma, VS and MCS along the
traits of wakefulness, awareness and mobility (ability to produce behaviour volitionally).
Figure taken from (Monti et al. 2009).

Glasgow Coma Scale (Teasdale & Jennett 1974), the Full Outline of Unresponsiveness
scale (Wijdicks et al. 2005), The Wessex Head Injury Matrix (Shiel et al. 2000), the
Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabilitation Technique (Gill-Thwaites & Munday
2004), and the JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) (Schnakers 2012;
Guldenmund et al. 2012), amongst others. Along with the Sensory Modality Assessment
and Rehabilitation Technique (SMART), The JFK CRS-R is internationally recognized
as the gold standard for differential diagnosis in DOC patients (Schnakers et al. 2009).
The CRS-R is one of the more widely used diagnostic tests because it doesn’t require any
formal training by its creators, and is free to use. Its diagnostic criteria are summarized in
Table 1.
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Table 1: Subscale diagnostic criteria for VS, MCS and EMCS from the CRS-R(Kalmar & Giacino
2007)

Diagnosis
Score

Scale
Behavioural Response

Auditory Function Scale
MCS
4
Consistent Movement to Command
MCS
3
Reproducible Movement to Command
VS
2
Localization to Sound
VS
1
Auditory Startle
VS
0
None
Visual Function Scale
MCS
5
Object Recognition
MCS
4
Object Localization: Reaching
MCS
3
Visual Pursuit
MCS
2
Fixation
VS
1
Visual Startle
VS
0
None
Motor Function Scale
EMCS
6
Functional Object Use
MCS
5
Automatic Motor Responses
MCS
4
Object Manipulation
MCS
3
Localization to Noxious Stimulation
VS
2
Flexion Withdrawal
VS
1
Abnormal Posturing
VS
0
None/Flaccid
Oromotor/Verbal Function Scale
MCS
3
Intelligible Verbalization
VS
2
Vocalization/Oral Movement
VS
1
Oral Reflexive Movement
VS
0
None
Communication Scale
EMCS
2
Functional: Accurate
MCS
1
Non-Functional: Intentional
VS
0
None
Arousal Scale
VS
3
Attention
VS
2
Eye Opening without Stimulation
VS
1
Eye Opening with Stimulation
VS
0
Unarousable
Adapted from (D. Cruse et al. 2012). Abbreviations: CRS-R = Coma Recovery ScaleRevised; EMCS = emergence from minimally conscious state; MCS = minimally
conscious state; VS = vegetative state
The CRS-R is comprised of a series of subscales that assess function across auditory,
visual, motor and oromotor or verbal categories. The scale also includes evaluation of a
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patients’ general state of arousal during the examination, and if certain criteria are met, an
assessment of communication abilities (Kalmar & Giacino 2007). Patients are assigned a
numeric score depending on their levels of responses in each category. This score ranges
from 0 to 23, and corresponds to a diagnosis of VS, MCS or EMCS. In some cases, the
presence of certain responses, such as replicable and accurate communication, can by
definition denote a certain diagnosis (in this case, EMCS), regardless of the patient’s
performance in other categories (Kalmar & Giacino 2007). This is because some sensory
modalities (eg. vision) may be impaired in a patient, leading to low scores in this
category despite preservation of other cognitive resources.
The CRS-R provides multiple alternatives when assessing higher-level functions to
account for the heterogeneous nature of DOC patients’ physical abilities. Evaluators can
ask specifically for eye, limb or mouth movements to command, depending on the
patient’s individual capabilities (Kalmar & Giacino 2007). It’s important to note that
responses in this assessment, regardless of the category, always require some type of
motoric output by the patient. One of the subscales that specifically assesses command
following is the Auditory Function Scale. This subscale is also one that compares more
easily with neuroimaging studies of command following, which generally use auditory
instructions for the patients (Fernández-Espejo & Owen 2013). In the Auditory Function
Scale, patients are given various verbal commands, such as touching one of two objects
presented to them (“touch the ball”), or making specific movements (“look up”). If they
successfully follow these commands every time, and within 10 seconds of receiving the
instruction, they’re considered to show “Consistent Movement to Command” and receive
the highest possible level in that subscale (4). Less consistent responding equates to
“Reproducible Movement to Command” and a score of 3. However, both scores indicate
command following, which is a marker of the MCS diagnosis. “Localization to Sound” is
worth a score of 2, and assigned when a patient is capable of orienting (turning their head
or eyes) towards an out-of-view auditory stimulus, such as a voice or a ringing bell.
Finally, if a patient only responds to a sudden loud noise, for example by fluttering or
blinking their eyes, they’re considered to show an “Auditory Startle”, worth a score of 1.
These last two responses are considered to be relatively automatic or reflexive processes
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rather than conscious, volitional action, and therefore correspond to a VS diagnosis
(Kalmar & Giacino 2007). If a patient shows none of these responses, they’re given a
score of 0 for the Auditory Function Scale.
1.2.2 Command Following vs. Communication in Behavioural Assessments
If a patient demonstrates command following in any of the subscales, evaluators will
administer the CRS-R’s Communication Scale’s six situational orientation questions.
First, at least one clear behavioural response will be established with the patient for the
purposes of communication. This behaviour, such as a head nod, will typically signify a
“yes” response. Then evaluators will ask a series of six questions based on visual or
auditory stimuli. For example, they may ask “Am I touching my ear right now?” while
touching their ear, and again when they’re not. Correct answers to all six questions
constitute “Functional Communication”, that is, providing reliable and clear responses
that are factually accurate. Functional communication is considered an indisputable sign
of consciousness, and consequently changes a patient’s diagnosis to emerging from the
minimally conscious state (EMCS) (Kalmar & Giacino 2007). The ability to
communicate with a patient allows for more accurate assessment of their physical
condition and well being, as well as opening up possibilities for various
neurorehabilitation strategies (Whyte et al. 1999).
Interestingly, a patient may also receive the score of “Non-Functional: Intentional
Communication” if they respond to at least two of the questions. Importantly, these
responses may or may not be accurate. This score corresponds to a diagnosis of MCS,
and is believed to reflect intention to communicate, or “communication readiness” which
may be impaired by the fluctuating levels of consciousness characteristic of MCS patients
(Bardin et al. 2011). Very few works have systematically studied the occurrence of
behavioural command following or communication in MCS patients. A recent report
including a cohort of 52 MCS patients identified command following in 33 per cent, and
non-functional communication in 19 per cent of them. Importantly, only 17 per cent of
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chronic patients (more than 1 year after the initial injury) showed command following
abilities, and none were able to communicate (Estraneo et al. 2014).
Non-functional communication is an interesting link between the two cognitive tasks,
command following and functional communication, that mark the diagnostic boundaries
of the minimally conscious state. The ability to communicate accurate answers is thought
to depend on preservation of a number of high-order cognitive processes, such as
autobiographical memory, semantic representations, mental orientation, etc. However,
when accuracy is not taking into account, as in non-functional communication, providing
responses to binary questions essentially requires the ability to select between two
alternative behaviours, representing ‘yes’ / ‘no’. Producing responses to command, and
selecting between these responses to “answer” a question (albeit inaccurately) are both
considered MCS behaviours. This diagnostic point might suggest that the one ability is
not significantly different than the other, at least in regards to awareness. Interestingly,
not all MCS patients who can follow commands can provide even inaccurate responses to
binary questions. So while responding to commands and selecting between responses
both fall in the MCS category, some patients can demonstrate the former but not the
latter. The specific cognitive mechanisms underlying the differences between the ability
to respond to a command, and the ability to select between two potential responses to
answer a binary question, have not been explored.
1.2.3 Limitations of Behavioural Assessments
While behavioural assessments are the standard diagnostic tool used by clinicians, there
are some challenges associated with their accuracy and reliability. Childs et al. found that
18 out of 49, or 37 per cent, of VS patients were misdiagnosed as VS, when they were
actually MCS, with standard behavioural tests (Childs et al. 1993). A similar finding was
reported in a 1996 study, where 43 per cent (17 our of 40) patients were misdiagnosed
(Andrews et al. 1996). More recently, a study using the CRS-R as a diagnostic tool found
a misdiagnosis rate of 41 per cent (18/44 patients) (Schnakers et al. 2009). This
variability may in part be due to the subjective nature of certain criterion in behavioural
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assessments, such as determining if a motor response (eg. eyeblink) is reflexive,
spontaneous, or a volitional action made by the patient (Guldenmund et al. 2012). To
further complicate matters, there are many clinical features associated with severe brain
damage that can interfere with the behavioural responses recruited to investigate
conscious awareness. These include motor system impairments, hearing or vision
problems, spasticity, seizures, and pain; as well as the potentially confounding effects of
any medication administered to treat these issues (Guldenmund et al. 2012). Fluctuations
in attention and wakefulness during administration of the test may also misrepresent a
patient’s true level of consciousness by providing only a “snapshot” of their current state
of arousal. Because no gold-standard measure of consciousness currently exists, it is
difficult to definitively evaluate any given assessments’ diagnostic reliability and validity
(Guldenmund et al. 2012). This is a serious concern for this clinical population, as
diagnosis can dictate a DOC patient’s clinical care and legal rights, and confidence in
diagnostic accuracy is especially important considering that patients considered to be VS
could have life-sustaining treatments removed (Fins 2003).
1.3 Assessing Covert Cognition in DOCs
A small group of patients who are incapable of performing volitional movements to
command can perform volitional motor imagery when instructed in neuroimaging
paradigms. These paradigms commonly use functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), which measures oxygenated blood flow in the brain, or EEG (Cruse et al. 2011;
D. Cruse et al. 2012; Forgacs et al. 2014). This is a phenomenon known as “covert’
cognition, which describes DOC patients who display no outward signs of consciousness,
but show brain activity consistent with complex cognitive functioning indicative of
awareness (Fernández-Espejo & Owen 2013)
Neuroimaging allows researchers to assess patients’ neural responses to a variety of
auditory, visual and tactile stimuli, and make inferences about what these responses may
signify in terms of their residual cognitive abilities. Multiple studies using different
neuroimaging techniques, including PET, EEG, and fMRI, have reported group level
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brain activity in primary sensory cortices but not secondary or tertiary association regions
in VS patients presented with auditory, visual or tactile stimuli (Laureys et al. 2002; S
Laureys et al. 2004). Collectively, these findings lead researchers to conclude that any
residual cognitive processing seen in VS patients does not reach the brain areas required
to create conscious awareness or experiences of these stimuli (Steven Laureys et al.
2004). However, there have been reported cases where patients diagnosed as vegetative
do have significant brain activation in higher associative areas in response to painful (de
Tommaso et al. 2013), auditory, and visual stimuli which was revealed when patients
were analyzed at the single subject level, rather than the group (Owen et al. 2002; Menon
DK, Owen AM, Williams EJ, Minhas PS, Allen CMC, Boniface SJ, Pickard JD 1998;
Fernández-Espejo et al. 2008; Monti et al. 2013). Neuroimaging results also show
activation in higher associative areas and greater functional connectivity across different
brain regions when MCS patients are presented with auditory (Boly et al. 2004) or
somatosensory stimuli (Boly et al. 2005) compared to VS patients. Some MCS patients
also react to emotional relevant stimuli, such as their own name or a story narrated by a
familiar voice, with brain activity patterns similar to healthy controls (Perrin et al. 2006;
Beckinschtein et al. 2004).
The diverse range of preserved cognitive capacity seen in DOC patients has led to the
development of two general types of neuroimaging tasks: passive and active. Passive
tasks present stimuli to patients without requiring any type of effortful response on their
behalf. These tasks are useful for exploring sensory processing abilities in patients, and
advantageous because they don’t rely exclusively on the patients’ ability to wilfully
participate or understand task instructions. However, this also means that limited
conclusions can be drawn regarding conscious cognitive processes with passive
paradigms (Bruno et al. 2010). By contrast, active paradigms do require effortful and
voluntary mental responses from patients. Therefore, successful performance in active
paradigms can indicate awareness.
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1.3.1 Active Paradigms: Command Following
In 2006, Owen and colleagues used fMRI to demonstrate preserved awareness in a
patient diagnosed as being VS (Owen et al. 2006). The paradigm, which has become a
gold standard for evaluating covert awareness in DOC patients, involved mental imagery
of motor and spatial-navigation tasks. Importantly, in a healthy brain, these two tasks
elicit activity in distinct regions (Boly et al. 2007). Therefore, researchers can discern
between the tasks being performed in the scanner based on the pattern of brain activity
produced. The motor task, in which participants are asked to imagine playing tennis,
activates the supplementary motor area, a region involved in motor planning and imagery
(Lotze & Halsband 2006). In contrast, the spatial navigation task, where participants are
asked to imagine walking around the different rooms in their house, activates
parahippocampal gyrus, posterior parietal-lobe and the lateral premotor cortex (Owen et
al. 2006). The VS patient reported in Owen et al.’s landmark 2006 study was able to
successfully perform both mental imagery tasks, demonstrating she was able to follow
commands. That is, her brain activity changed reliably with the different imagery
commands and resembled that of healthy controls performing the same tasks. Successful
performance of mental imagery tasks like this one requires fairly complex cognitive
functions typically associated with normal consciousness, including sustained attention,
language comprehension (of the instructions), and working memory (to maintain the
appropriate mental imagery during the task) (Cruse et al. 2011). This wilful modulating
of one’s brain activity in response to instruction represents covert command following,
which is considered proof of awareness. Therefore, this finding was especially significant
because the patient showed no observable behavioural evidence of command following
or in fact any signs of awareness during standard behavioural assessments of
consciousness. Nevertheless, her robust and accurate mental responses to commands in
the fMRI paradigm suggested that she retained residual cognitive functions and possessed
conscious awareness of herself and her surroundings (Owen et al. 2006).
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Almost a decade later, a growing number of neuroimaging studies have used a variety of
cognitive tasks to explore covert command following in DOC patients, including mental
imagery, attention and verbal reasoning. To date, 61 patients have successfully followed
commands by modulating their brain activity in both fMRI and EEG paradigms (cases of
command following demonstrated in neuroimaging paradigms are summarized in Table 2
and 3. In some cases the same patient is reported in multiple paradigms). Several studies
have employed auditory or visual attention to probe residual cognitive functioning in
DOC patients (Naci & Owen 2013; Monti et al. 2014; Schnakers et al. 2008; Lulé et al.
2013; Pan et al. 2014). Attention tasks were proposed as a less demanding alternative to
mental imagery, based on the observation that significant brain activity is not always
elicited in mental imagery tasks even in healthy volunteers (Guger et al. 2003). In these
tasks, participants are asked to focus their attention on specific stimuli, such as photos,
words or numbers. Selective and sustained attention are considered conscious mental
processes needed to perform basic cognitive tasks and form cohesive thoughts about
ourselves and our surroundings (Naci & Owen 2013). Therefore, patients who showed
brain activity in attention networks in response to commands are considered to be aware
(Naci & Owen 2013; Monti et al. 2014; Schnakers et al. 2008; Lulé et al. 2013; Pan et al.
2014).
However, mental imagery is still the most commonly used cognitive task in
neuroimaging paradigms that investigate covert consciousness (Monti et al. 2010;
Hampshire et al. 2013; Forgacs et al. 2014). Since 2006, the tennis-house neuroimaging
paradigm has been used in multiple studies to demonstrate covert command following in
both VS and MCS patients (Fernández-Espejo & Owen 2013; Gibson et al. 2014). For
example, a study by Monti et al. 2010 found that five out of 23 DOC patients, four of
which were diagnosed as VS and one as MCS, accurately and reliably followed
instructions to imagine playing tennis or walking around their house (Monti et al. 2010).
Motor imagery in particular is frequently used in covert command following tasks,
ranging from relatively complex, full-body motor imagery, such as swimming (Bardin et
al. 2011; Goldfine et al. 2012), to smaller more specific actions, such as squeezing your
hand (Bekinschtein et al. 2011). Cruse and colleagues were able to distinguish between
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the sensorimotor patterns of two imagined actions (squeezing your right hand or wiggling
the toes of both feet) in healthy participants, VS (Cruse et al. 2011; Damian Cruse et al.
2012) and MCS patients (D. Cruse et al. 2012) using EEG. Similar to previous
neuroimaging studies, the three VS patients who successfully followed commands with
motor imagery in this paradigm did not show even low-level behavioural signs of
awareness, such as visual fixation or localization to painful stimuli, when assessed at the
bedside (Cruse et al. 2011). Interestingly, 38 per cent of the MCS patients who
successfully performed the motor imagery task also showed no motoric responses to
commands in bedside tests (D. Cruse et al. 2012).
Coyle and colleagues recently used the hand and toe motor imagery task to train four
MCS patients with an EEG-based Brain Computer Interface (BCI) (Coyle D, Stow J,
McCreadie K, McElligott J, Carroll A 2014). All the patients exceeded the 70 per cent
criterion for a dual-task BCI, indicating that they could successfully perform each motor
imagery task to command. Coyle et al. also provided patients with visual or auditory realtime feedback during training sessions. This feedback was produced by analyzing their
sensorimotor rhythms as they performed the mental imagery, and presented as a visual or
auditory stimulus that could be influenced directly by the patient’s changing brain
activity. For example, a patient could guide a virtual basketball into a hoop by imagining
squeezing their hand to move the ball left or wiggling their toe to move the ball right. The
patient who had the most training sessions also had the best performance, with
classification accuracies over 80 per cent. The researchers believe this performance
enhancement is evidence of sensorimotor learning, which would likely only take place if
the patient was consciously aware throughout the training sessions (Coyle D, Stow J,
McCreadie K, McElligott J, Carroll A 2014).
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Table 2: fMRI studies with active paradigms.
Study

DOC
patients
tested

Owen et al. 2006

1

Monti et al. 2010*

54

Bardin et al. 2011

6

Bekinschtein et al.
2011

5

Fernández-Espejo
& Owen 2013*

1

Naci et al. 2013*

3

Hampshire et al.
2013

1

Monti et al. 2013

1

Forgacs et al.
2014

26

Gibson et al. 2014

6

Monti et al. 2014

28

fMRI Task

Number of
patients who
followed
commands✜
1

Diagnosis &
Aetiology

5

2

4 VS, 1 MCS:
all T
1 MCS: NT,
1 (E)MCS: T
2 VS: T

Mental Imagery
(tennis & house)

1

1 VS: T

Auditory Attention
(counting target
words)
Mental Imagery &
Verbal Reasoning

3
1

2 MCS: 1 T,
1 NT,
1 VS: T
VS: T

Visual Attention
(look at face/house)
Mental Imagery
(swimming & deck
of cards)
Mental Imagery
(tennis & house)

1

1 MCS : T

4

Auditory Attention
(counting target
words)

10

3 MCS: 2 T,
1 NT,
1 EMCS: T
2 VS: 1 T,
1 NT
1 MCS : NT
3 VS: 1 T, 2
NT;
6 MCS: 3 T, 3
NT
1 EMCS: NT

Mental Imagery
(tennis & house)
Mental Imagery
(tennis & house)
Motor Imagery
(swimming)
Attempted hand
movement

2

3

1 VS: T

Total: 33
Asterisk (*) indicate studies in which patients also functionally communicated, ✜
Locked-in State patients were not included in this table. Abbreviations: VS = Vegetative
state, MCS = Minimally Conscious State, EMCS = Emerging from Minimally Conscious
State, (E)MCS = fluctuating between MCS and EMCS diagnosis, T =brain injury of
traumatic origin, NT = non-traumatic brain injury.

16
Table 3: EEG studies with active paradigms.
Study

DOC
patients
tested

EEG Task

Schnakers et al.
2008

22

Cruse et al. 2011

16

Goldfine et al.
2011

3

Cruse et al. 2012a

23

Cruse et al. 2012b

1

Lulé et al. 2013

18

Pan et al. 2014

6

Auditory Attention
(counting target
names)
Motor Imagery
(squeeze hand,
wiggle toes)
Motor Imagery
(swimming) &
spatial navigation
(house)
Motor Imagery
(squeeze hand,
wiggle toes)
Attempted
movement (squeeze
hand)
Auditory Attention
to target word
Visual Attention to
target photo

Gibson et al. 2014

6

Horki et al. 2014

6

Coyle et al. 2015

4

Motor Imagery
(squeeze hand,
wiggle toes)
Mental imagery
(imagine playing
sport, spatial
navigation) &
attempted foot
movement
Motor imagery
(hand squeeze,
wiggle toes)

Number of
patients who
followed
commands✜
9

Diagnosis &
Aetiology

3

3 VS: 2 T,
1 NT

1

1 (E)MCS: T

5

5 MCS: T

1

1 VTS:T

1

1 MCS: NR

4

2 VS: 1 T, 1
NT, 2 MCS: 1
T, 1 NT
1 VS: T,
1 MCS: NT

2

9 MCS: 5 T,
4 NT

2

2 MCS, T

4

4 MCS: 1 T, 2
NT, 1 NR

Total: 32
✜ Locked-in State patients were not included in this table. Abbreviations: VS =
Vegetative state, MCS = Minimally Conscious State, EMCS = Emerging from Minimally
Conscious State, (E)MCS = fluctuating between MCS and EMCS diagnosis, T =brain
injury of traumatic origin, NT = non-traumatic brain injury, NR = not reported.

17
1.3.2 Command Following vs. Communication: Covert Assessments
As described above, a small number of patients who are incapable of responding overtly
are able to follow commands by willfully modulating their brain activity in mental
imagery tasks (Fernández-Espejo & Owen, 2013). An even smaller proportion may be
able to use these differential brain responses to communicate answers to binary yes/no
questions, which has served as the theoretical basis for the development of braincomputer interfaces (BCIs) that could help patients express their thoughts externally to
communicate with others. Of the 61 patients who have successfully demonstrated
command following in neuroimaging tasks, to our knowledge only three have been able
to functionally communicate using these mental responses. In all three cases this
communication occurred despite the patients showing no externally observable
communicative abilities over repeated behavioural testing.
The first DOC patient who used mental imagery to communicate was reported in Monti
et al’s 2010 study. This patient was a 22 year-old male who was in a VS after a traumatic
brain injury. He had no behavioural signs of command following or communication, but
his robust brain responses during the tennis/house task indicated that he was able to
perform both tasks to command. Therefore, researchers asked him to perform one type of
mental imagery to signify yes and the other to signify no, and asked him six binary
(yes/no) autobiographical questions. He correctly answered five of these questions by
performing the appropriate mental imagery task, while no response could be detected for
the last question (Monti et al. 2010).
The second patient to communicate solely by modulating his brain activity did so using
the same tennis/house fMRI task. He was a 38 year-old male who was consistently
diagnosed as VS after a traumatic brain-injury in a motor vehicle accident 12 years
previously (Fernández-Espejo & Owen 2013). When his ability to successfully follow
commands with this mental imagery task was discovered, researchers asked him a series
of questions about himself, his environment, and his care. Like the first patient, he did not
always respond to questions, which may have been due to fluctuations in attention and
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arousal during different scanning sessions. However, the authors were able to decode
answers to twelve questions, including correct responses to questions about his name, the
name of his personal support worker and the date (Fernández-Espejo & Owen 2013).
This patient also demonstrated functional communication when tested with a separate
fMRI paradigm, described below.
An fMRI study in our lab led by Naci (2013) posed a series of binary questions to healthy
volunteers and asked them to answer by focussing their attention on the appropriate
response word (“yes” or “no”) among a series of words presented through headphones
(Naci et al. 2013). They were able to successfully decode 90 per cent of the subjects’
answers by measuring activity in brain regions associated with attention. These attentionspecific regions of interest (ROI) were defined individually for each subject based on
their brain activity during a previous selective attention task requiring them to count how
many times they heard a target word in a series of unrelated words (Naci et al. 2013).
When three DOC patients were tested with the same auditory attention tasks, all three
were able to selectively attend to target words, and two successfully communicated
answers to questions by modulating their attention (Naci & Owen 2013). One of these
patients was the same 38 year-old male diagnosed as VS that was described previously
(Fernandez-Espejo & Owen 2013). In this task he accurately responded to all four
questions by selectively attending to the correct answer. The second patient was a 25
year-old male diagnosed as MCS after a traumatic brain injury. Appropriate brain activity
in this patient’s predetermined attention-specific ROIs was seen for two out of four
questions (Naci & Owen 2013). In the other two questions, the correct response could be
decoded from activity in areas outside the ROIs that are also associated with attention.
Interestingly, neither patient was able to display any behavioural signs of command
following or communication in repeated bedside assessments conducted by the research
team leading up to and at the time of the fMRI scan (Naci & Owen 2013; FernándezEspejo & Owen 2013).
These three patients provide evidence that neuroimaging techniques can be used to
establish functional communication with DOC patients who demonstrate covert cognition
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but are incapable of communicating behaviourally. Researchers rarely report nonsuccessful attempts to establish functional communication with DOC patients using
neuroimaging techniques, therefore it is difficult to estimate the total number of patients
who can use mental responses to follow commands, but not communicate. However, a
reasonable inference is that the majority of patients who successfully follow commands
in neuroimaging tasks are unable to communicate in these tasks (Fernández-Espejo &
Owen 2013).
As with behavioural assessments for DOCs, the specific cognitive distinctions between
command following and communication in covert tasks have not been explicitly studied.
In their paper on brain-computer interface (BCI) use in DOC patients, Kübler and
Kotchoubey speculated about the cognitive demands required for patients to
communicate with, versus merely operate, a typical dual-task BCI (Kübler & Kotchoubey
2007). Operating a BCI requires patients to wilfully modulate their brain activity in
response to different commands made by the experimenter (eg: imagine playing tennis,
imagine walking around your house). In the case of these command following tasks, the
requested response is dictated or “pre-set” by the experimenter (Kübler & Kotchoubey
2007). Whereas in communication tasks, a patient must allocate their attention to make a
decision about the response they will make (yes/no) and choose the correct mental task
(eg. imagine tennis) that signifies this response (Kübler & Kotchoubey 2007). This extra
level of decision-making required in communication versus command following could be
one factor that influences whether a patient can perform one or both tasks.
1.4 Passive Paradigms
While active paradigms have shown great success in demonstrating covert awareness in
DOC patients, they are very cognitively demanding and therefore only effective in a
small subset of them. Measuring brain responses to passive presentations of different
stimuli can provide information on residual functioning in their corresponding neural
systems. For example, designing tasks that present patients with noise, words and
sentences and then analyzing the resulting brain activity may reveal a spectrum of
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responses, from automatic, low level auditory processing to high level, semantic
comprehension. Paradigms that passively present stimuli, such as sound clips with or
without emotional content (eg. noise, words, stories, versus patient’s name, baby cries),
or images (eg. computer screen displays, faces) have successfully been used in DOC
patients to study auditory, emotional and visual processing respectively (S Laureys et al.
2004; Perrin et al. 2006; Owen et al. 2002). Interestingly, to our knowledge a
neuroimaging paradigm designed specifically to explore passive movement has not been
formally studied in DOC patients. A recent fMRI study in our group reported a patient
who displayed similar patterns of neural activity as healthy controls when they were
exposed to the same audiovisual stimuli (Naci et al. 2014). This activity was elicited
simply by showing the patient a movie clip, without giving any specific directions or
asking for a mental response. Passive paradigms have also been used in coma patients,
largely in an effort to find specific neural responses to external stimuli that have
prognostic value (Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2008). Neuroimaging studies have presented
coma patients with tactile (Logi et al. 2003; Gofton et al. 2009) and auditory stimulation,
including the patient’s name (Fischer et al. 2008), and compared the resulting brain
responses to patients’ subsequent clinical progression. For example, absent or abnormal
components of a brain response called a somatosensory evoked potential (SSEP), which
occurs in response to tactile stimulation, typically indicates a poor clinical outcome
(Cruse et al. 2014).
1.5 Motor Function in DOCs
The main disadvantage to diagnostic tests that rely exclusively on behavioural
observations is the considerable variability that exists in DOC patients’ motor function
(Pistoia et al. 2013). In these assessments, motor responses such as eye, mouth and limb
movements are the only means for patients to demonstrate conscious awareness. Impaired
motor functioning in these patients can result in limited, unreliable, or non-existent
voluntary motor behaviour, which can erroneously be interpreted as a lack of awareness
(S Laureys et al. 2004). Despite the significance of motor responses in terms of clinical
diagnostic tests, motor function has not been extensively studied in this population. The
degree of cortical reorganization that occurs in motor-related brain areas after serious
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traumatic or non-traumatic injury has not been thoroughly characterized (Lapitskaya et al.
2013a). A recent study involving 47 DOC patients (24 VS, 23 MCS) found abnormalities
in certain neurophysiological markers of corticospinal pathway and motor cortex function
compared to healthy controls (Lapitskaya et al. 2013b). Interestingly, some measures of
motor system integrity, such as motor and sensory evoked potentials, did not differ from
normal healthy volunteers, indicating that an inability to wilfully move may not always
be associated with typical signs of an impaired motor system. However, the overall
finding in the patients studied was one of decreased excitability in the corticospinal
pathways necessary for generating movement (Lapitskaya et al. 2013b).
The possibility of using neurostimulation techniques to improve sensorimotor function in
DOC patients, and thereby establish a reliable means to express residual awareness has
been proposed (Angelakis et al. 2014; Pistoia et al. 2013). In 2013 Pistoia et al. created a
paradigm designed to stimulate motor activity that combined visual demonstrations of a
specific movement (opening and closing the hand) with transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) applied to the motor cortex in six VS patients. They reported improvements in
motor responsiveness in four of these patients when they were asked to observe and
imitate a researcher’s hand movements, as measured by increases in their motor evoked
potentials (MEPs) (Pistoia et al. 2013). Exactly how this improvement occurred is not
understood, and may be partially attributed to a general recovery of consciousness (three
of the four patients later regained higher motor and command following abilities) (Pistoia
et al. 2013).
As described above (section 1.3.1), motor imagery has proven to be one possible
alternative to overt movement in assessments of consciousness. The interesting
dissociation that neuroimaging experiments have revealed between intact motor imagery
and absent motor execution abilities in DOC patients could be explained by differences in
their neural basis. Motor imagery involves an internal mental representation of an overt
action without any concurrent executed movement (Jeannerod 1995). In contrast, motor
execution involves physically performing the movement. Neuroimaging studies have
shown that motor imagery and execution produce similar patterns of brain activity (Porro
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et al. 1996; Lotze & Halsband 2006), leading some to consider motor imagery and motor
preparation (the mental processes leading up to but not including actual movement) as
essentially equivalent (Stephan et al. 1995; Jeannerod 1995). However, there is growing
evidence for subtle but important differences in functional brain activation and
connectivity between motor imagery and execution (James M. Kilner et al. 2004;
Carrillo-de-la-Peña et al. 2008; Xu et al. 2014). While both tasks share a common
network of sensorimotor areas, when compared directly, executing a movement typically
recruits more cerebellum, primary motor and somatosensory cortices than imagining that
movement, which involves more inferior parietal and frontal regions including presupplementary motor area (SMA) and superior and inferior frontal gyri (Gerardin et al.
2000; Szameitat et al. 2012; Machado et al. 2013; Burianová et al. 2013). Subtle but
important differences in cortical damage to the neural mechanisms behind motor
execution and imagery could explain why some DOC patients can perform one and not
the other in response to commands.
1.5.1 Using Passive Movement to Investigate Sensorimotor Function
Whether a particular DOC patient’s inability to execute movement to command arises
from specific impairments in their motor system, or cognitive processes associated with
volition, or a combination of both is not known. Passive movement, where an
experimenter moves a participant while they remain relaxed, activates the same motorrelated regions as executed movement, albeit to a lesser extent. Numerous neuroimaging
studies in healthy volunteers have found similar patterns of brain activity between active
and passive movement. Alary et al. (1998) found significant activation in brain areas
associated with movement (cerebellum, premotor cortex, supplementary motor area, or
SMA) and somatosensory regions (primary sensorimotor cortex, inferior parietal cortex)
when subjects’ wrists were passively extended (Alary et al. 1998). Two fMRI studies
that directly compared passive vs. active elbow flexion reported weaker, yet significant
brain activity when an MRI-compatible robot moved subject’s arms (passive) compared
to when subjects moved themselves (active) (Yu et al. 2011; Estévez et al. 2014).
Activation in passive and active movement conditions involved similar brain structures,

23
including the primary motor (M1) and somatosensory cortex (S1), cingulate motor area
(CMA), SMA, thalamus, basal ganglia and cerebellum.
To our knowledge, only one study has reported investigating neural responses to passive
movement in a single DOC patient (Horki et al. 2014). These researchers were hoping to
exploit the similarity in brain activity between active and passive movement in their
development of motor imagery-based BCIs, with the goal of using brain activity elicited
during passive movement as a classifier for subsequent motor imagery (Horki et al.
2014). However, brain activity produced in response to passive movement itself can
provide valuable information about a patient. Both command following and response
selection require decision-making, or volitional intention, by the patient, whether it be the
decision to move to command, or selecting between two alternative actions to
communicate. Passive movement is considered to be a different process than voluntary
movement initiated by an individual (Haggard 2008) because it lacks a conscious
intention to move. In philosophical terms, the conscious decision to act is the answer to
the question, “what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that
I raise my arm?” (Haggard 2008). In cognitive neuroscience, decisions regarding
volitional movement are thought to arise from various frontal and parietal brain areas.
Brain responses to passive movement (movement in the absence of wilful intention)
could help indicate why a patient may be incapable of volitional movement to command,
by providing information on their sensorimotor function.
Overview of Thesis
1.6 Study Objectives
A clear distinction between command following and communication can be found in both
behavioural and neuroimaging assessments of DOC patients: not all MCS patients who
can follow commands can communicate. Importantly, the underlying neural basis behind
these cognitive distinctions in DOC patients has never been explored. Furthermore,
motoric action is the most common modality for patients to respond to commands or
questions. Whether an action is executed in a bedside assessment, or imagined in a
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neuroimaging paradigm, both responses require patients to make a volitional decision to
act. However, an absence of motor responses (executed or imagined) to cognitive tasks
may not indicate a lack of awareness, but rather impairments to a patient’s motor system.
This study designed an fMRI paradigm for healthy participants, in order to answer three
important questions raised when assessing residual cognitive function in DOC patients.
1) First, we wanted to determine if there is clear neural evidence for a cognitive
difference between command following and communication, and characterize the
brain structures that contribute to this distinction.
2) Second, we wanted to explore if this distinction depends on how the response is
made, by studying the two most common response modalities used in DOC
assessments, motor execution and motor imagery. We know that some DOC
patients can respond to commands or questions in one modality but not the other.
Therefore, we also wanted to investigate if an interaction exists between the
cognitive resources involved in choosing to respond, and those involved in
expressing the response (execution/imagery), or if these processes are distinct in
the brain.
3) Third, we wanted to explore the existence of a hierarchy in volitional movement,
from passive movement (with no wilful motoric output by the individual) to
command following (volitional response), and finally action selection, which
represents greater movement-decision making by the participant. This hierarchy
could help explain the range in behavioural abilities seen in DOC patients.
Furthermore, activation in sensorimotor regions, induced by somatosensory
signals associated with passive movement, could indicate whether or not an
unresponsive patient’s sensorimotor pathways are functionally intact.
Involvement of higher-order cognitive processes in communication will vary according to
the specific question being asked, and their individual contributions to accurate
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communication can be difficult to disentangle. Our experiment employed a simpler
cognitive aspect of communication that is inherent to many communication paradigms
used in DOC patients. This is a binary response format, where one response is assigned to
indicate a “yes” answer, and a different response is designated as a “no” answer.
Regardless of the accuracy of their answer, this format requires the ability to select
between two alternative behaviours. In our experiment, participants were allowed to
select between two motor responses, and this “action selection” represented binary
communication in its most basic form. This extra level of response selection is an
important step in communicating an answer, compared to simply performing an action in
response to command.
Therefore, our fMRI paradigm involved two distinct arm movements where healthy
participants used both motor execution (behavioural) and motor imagery (mental) to
express their responses. We measured brain activity elicited when healthy participants
selected between two possible movement alternatives (‘action selection’) versus when
participants’ movements were dictated to them (‘command following’). This allowed us
to explore the effects of these different levels of selection and task expression, and
whether or not an interaction exits between them. We also included a condition where the
experimenters passively moved participants’ arms. This allowed us to characterize the
neural response to passive movement and compare it to conditions where participants
have increasing levels of volitional control over their movements, such as deciding
whether to move (command following) and if so, which movement to perform (action
selection).
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Chapter 2: Experiment – Comparing Command Following and Communication in
different response modalities
This experiment explored neural activity associated with action selection and command
following using executed and imagined movements in healthy participants. Because there
is a possibility this experiment may one day be adapted for use in DOC patients, our
paradigm used a block design, with a block length of 20 seconds and a total task length of
8 minutes. Block designs, where brain activity is elicited during concentrated periods of
time alternated with rest, allow for the collection of neural data with a reasonable level of
statistical power in a relatively short period of time (Aguirre & D’Esposito 1999). They
are especially advantageous for DOC patients, whose brain injuries and physical
condition often limit the time they can spend comfortably in the MR scanner. The block
length of 20 seconds was chosen based on previous pilot experiments in our lab that
aimed to determine the ideal block length for optimizing brain activity associated with
motor imagery tasks.
The fMRI paradigm used in this experiment was based in part off of a previous motor
imagery/motor execution experiment in our lab (Fernández-Espejo et al, accepted). In
that study, participants lay in the scanner with a tennis ball placed before them, and their
right arm bent at the elbow with their forearm rested across their stomach. They were
instructed to either imagine or perform a swinging movement with their right forearm
when they heard a regularly timed cue, in an attempt to “hit” the ball. The current
experiment used this right forearm movement because it was shown to reliably elicit the
appropriate, expected brain activity both when executed and imagined (Fernández-Espejo
et al, accepted). In addition, we also included another movement where participants
raised and lowered their right forearm in a “lifting” motion. These two movements
represented a binary response system, which is frequently used in behavioural
assessments of communication in DOC patients (Kalmar & Giacino 2007). We modelled
“action selection”, by asking participants to select a motor response from the two
movement alternatives six times over the block, thereby creating a sequence of six
movements. To demonstrate “command following”, participants were given a
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predetermined sequence of six movements. Six movements were chosen because this was
the maximum number that could be physically performed within a 20 second time frame,
factoring in the time for audio instruction cues, pauses in between movements, and
performance of the movements themselves (approximately two seconds each). This is
also the same pacing of the cued movements used in Fernández-Espejo et al’s experiment
(Fernández-Espejo et al, accepted). Furthermore, the CRS-R communication scale
involves six questions to which patients are asked to respond (Kalmar & Giacino 2007).
2.1 Materials and Methods
2.1.1 Participants
Fifteen right-handed healthy volunteers (ages 19 to 29, average 24 years; 8 females) with
no history of neurological or psychiatric disease participated in the study. All volunteers
gave written informed consent and were compensated for their participation in the
experiment. The Health Sciences Research Ethics Board of the University of Western
Ontario provided ethical approval for the study.
2.1.2 fMRI paradigm
Participants lay supine with their right arm bent at an approximately 90° angle, so that
their forearm rested across their torso. Because movements of the shoulder and upper arm
may induce artifacts in the participant's data (Rossit et al, 2013), a strap around the
participant’s chest was used to minimize upper arm and shoulder movements, while
allowing for full rotation at the elbow.
Figure 2 describes the fMRI paradigm used in this experiment. While in the MRI scanner,
participants were instructed to either execute or imagine a series of movements involving
their right forearm. We used two different arm movements: a ‘slide’, which involved
sliding the forearm forward and back; and a ‘lift’, which involved lifting and lowering the
forearm. Each sequence involved six movements (combining ‘slides’ and ‘lifts’). The
beginning of each block was cued with the word ‘move’ or ‘imagine’. Within each block
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(imagery or execution), participants either received a pre-determined sequence or were
asked to create one. For the blocks with pre-determined sequences, each individual action
was cued with the word ‘slide’ or ‘lift’. For those where the subject had to create their
own sequence, each action was cued with the word ‘go’. In another condition,
participants were instructed to relax while a researcher moved their arm. This “passive”
movement condition used the same pre-determined movement sequences as before, but
without the accompanying auditory cues. Finally, we included a “rest” condition where
participants were told to relax and lie still in the scanner. There were 4 blocks of each
condition, each lasting 20 seconds and presented in a pseudorandom order for a total of
24 blocks over 8 minutes.

Motor Imagery
Motor Execution

Action Selection

Command Following

Passive

Subjects choose
which movement to
perform (slide/lift)
when they hear the
word “go” to create
their own sequence
Green

Subjects are given
different movement
sequences by
experimenters
Eg. “slide lift lift slide
lift slide”
Red

Subjects lie still
as they are
passively
moved by
experimenters

Dark blue

Light blue

Purple

n/a

4 X each block
(+ 4 rest blocks)

24 blocks total, pseudorandomized for each subject

Task length: 8 minutes
Figure 2: Paradigm for fMRI experiment. Each block was 20 seconds long. During rest
blocks (in orange), subjects lay still in the scanner.
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Each participant was randomly assigned four out of a possible 48 unique movement
sequences, which were presented pseudo-randomly throughout the blocks. All
participants completed 2 runs of this task. An infrared MR-compatible camera (MRC
Systems GmbH), placed above the participant's head, was used to record participants’
actions for each run.
2.1.3 Image acquisition
Data was acquired in a 3T Siemens scanner (Magnetom Prisma, Siemens, Germany) with
a Siemens 32-channel head-coil at the Centre for Functional and Metabolic Mapping
(CFMM) at Robarts Research Institute. Audio instructions and task cues were presented
using Matlab® R2011a on a MacBook Pro laptop (OSX 10.6.8) and an MRI-compatible
high-quality digital sound system via noise-attenuated headphones (Sensimetrics, S14).
The fMRI protocol included two sessions of 240 volumes each, using echo-planar images
(36 axial slices, TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, matrix size = 70×70, slice thickness = 3 mm,
in-plane resolution = 3×3 mm, flip angle = 78°). A high-resolution T1-weighted
MPRAGE structural image (TR = 2300 ms, TE = 2.32 ms, IT = 900, matrix size =
256×256, voxel size 1×1×1 mm, flip angle = 8°) was also acquired.
2.1.4 fMRI data analysis
We performed Independent Component Analysis using the FSL MELODIC tool
(http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk./fsl) in order to remove motion artifacts (Friston et al, 1996;
McKeown et al, 1998; Beckmann & Smith, 2004). We visually inspected all the
components and identified those that corresponded to head-motion artifacts and were
correlated with the execution blocks (an average of 5±2.6 components per subject per
run). Finally, we removed the identified components from the fMRI data. The de-noised
data was then pre-processed and analyzed with SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
After manually AC-PC reorienting the data, the following spatial pre-processing steps
took place: realignment, co-registration of the structural and functional data, spatial
normalization to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space, and smoothing with an 8-

30
mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. High-pass filtering with a cut-off period of 128 seconds
was used to remove linear drift.
To address this study’s first and second aim, a single subject fixed-effect 2-by-2 factorial
analysis was performed for each subject at the whole-brain level. Factor 1 was defined as
“Task” with two levels (motor imagery / motor execution) and Factor 2 was defined as
“Level of selection”, with two levels (action selection/command following). The design
matrix modeled scans as belonging to the action selection/motor execution, command
following/motor execution, action selection/motor imagery, or command following/motor
imagery conditions using the canonical heamodynamic response function (Friston et al.
1995) the participant’s rest condition used as a baseline. Realignment parameters and
passive movement blocks were modeled as effects of non-interest. All 15 participants
were included in the group analyses, which consisted of one-sample t-tests for each
contrast of interest. The statistical threshold was set at a Family Wise Error (FWE)
corrected p <0.05 at the cluster-level. Two additional contrasts, individually comparing
move and imagine conditions to rest, were also included to confirm that the task elicited a
similar pattern of activation as previous motor tasks in our lab (Owen et al. 2006;
Fernández-Espejo et al. 2014).
For the study’s third aim, we performed a single subject, one-way ANOVA to compare
passive movement to “active” movement conditions, where participants executed
movements that were either determined by the experimenter (command following) or
selected between two possible alternatives (action selection). Therefore, the single factor
of “Executed Movement” had three levels: Action Selection, Command Following and
Passive. The design matrix modeled scans as belonging to one of these three conditions,
with the participant’s rest condition as a baseline, once again using the canonical
heamodynamic response function (Friston et al. 1995). Realignment parameters and all
blocks involving imagined movement were modeled as effects of non-interest. We
performed a one-sample t-test for each contrast of interest in all 15 participants for the
group analyses. To further explore brain activity elicited by passive movement, we
included three additional contrasts comparing passive movement to rest, passive to “all
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active” movement (command following and action selection combined) and “all active”
to passive movement. For all analyses, the FSL Harvard-Oxford Cortical and Subcortical
Structural Atlases were used for anatomical identification (see Appendix I).
2. 3 Results
2.3.1 Factorial Analysis
Motor Execution and Motor Imagery vs. rest
Motor execution (move conditions) compared to rest significantly activated the right
cerebellum and left sensorimotor area, including the primary motor (M1) and
somatosensory (S1) cortices, located on the pre and post-central gyrus respectively.
Motor imagery (imagine conditions) compared to rest elicited significant activity in
several regions including the left supplementary motor area (SMA) and somatosensory
association cortex as well as the left prefrontal cortex (frontal pole & middle frontal
gyrus). Significant group activations are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Activity Elicited by Motor Execution and Imagery
Motor Execution > rest
Brain structure
Coordinates
Cluster
T value
x y
z
size (k)
Cerebellum
24 -46 -26
172
12.3
Precentral/Postcentral gyrus
-30 -25 58
195
7.87
Motor Imagery > rest
Middle temporal gyrus
-66 -40 1
359
12.03
Frontal pole
-36 47 -8
645
7.35
Middle frontal gyrus
-36 5 61
153
6.78
Superior temporal gyrus
66 -16 1
260
6.54
Angular gyrus
-45 -55 55
295
6.49
Juxtapositional lobule cortex
-3 8 55
166
4.8
*Results thresholded at FWE-corrected p<0.05 for cluster level activation

p value
0.033
0.023
0.001
<0.001
0.029
0.004
0.002
0.022

Motor Imagery vs. Motor Execution
The positive effect of task (i.e. motor execution versus motor imagery) revealed
significant clusters of activation in the right cerebellum, as well as the left sensorimotor
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area, as shown in Figure 3. The latter included M1, the primary somatosensory cortex
(S1), and the superior parietal lobule.
The negative effect of task (i.e. motor imagery versus motor execution) revealed
significant activity in the right S1 and M1, left inferior frontal gyrus and right occipital
pole (representing the primary and secondary visual cortices). Group activations are
shown in Table 5.

Motor Execution > Motor Imagery

Figure 3: The positive effect of Task compares brain activity elicited in conditions with
motor execution to motor imagery. Results thresholded at FWE-corrected p<0.05 for
cluster level activation.
Table 5: Motor Imagery vs. Motor Execution
Positive effect of Task (Motor Execution > Motor Imagery)
Brain structure
Coordinates
Cluster
T value
x y z
size (k)
Cerebellum
24 -46 -26
197
11.91
Superior parietal lobule/postcentral
-24 -43 61
409
7.33
gyrus
Negative effect of Task (Motor Imagery > Motor Execution)
Postcentral/ Precentral gyrus
39 -25 61
2332
10.22
Inferior frontal gyrus
-57 20 22
6391
9.28
Occipital pole
12 -88 28
852
7.0
*Results thresholded at FWE-corrected p<0.05 for cluster level activation

p value
0.03
0.002
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

Action selection vs. command following
The positive effect of level of selection (i.e. conditions where the participant had to
choose between two actions versus those in which the action was determined by the
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experimenter) revealed significant activity in frontal regions including the left middle
frontal gyrus, and the right paracingulate gyrus (including pre-SMA) as illustrated in
Figure 4. There was also significant activation in the somatosensory association cortex,
specifically the right angular gyrus and left supramarginal gyrus, as well as the left insula.
The inverse contrast (command following versus action selection) showed bilateral
activation in the lateral occipital cortex (extrastriate visual area) and primary auditory
cortices. Group activations are shown in Table 6.

Action Selection > Command Following

Figure 4: The positive effect of level of selection compares brain activity in action
selection to command following conditions. Results thresholded at FWE-corrected
p<0.05 for cluster level activation.
Table 6: Action Selection vs. Command Following
Positive effect of Level of Selection (action selection > command following)
Brain structure
Coordinates
Cluster
T value p value
x y z
size (k)
Paracingulate gyrus
3 20 46
2826
9.67
<0.001
Middle frontal gyrus
-36 29 31
441
8.83
<0.001
Angular gyrus
45 -49 40
439
7.16
<0.001
Supramarginal gyrus
-48 -46 40
189
6.54
0.009
Insular cortex
-33 17 1
193
5.89
0.008
Negative effect of Level of Selection (command following > action selection)
Lateral occipital cortex
51 -67 7
952
11.91
<0.001
Lateral occipital cortex
-48 -73 10
251
9.59
0.003
Superior temporal gyrus
-63 -19 1
666
7.98
<0.001
Heschl’s gyrus
48 -13 1
600
6.72
<0.001
*Results thresholded at FWE-corrected p<0.05 for cluster level activation
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Interactions
There were no significant interactions between Task and Level of Selection. No
significant effects were found even when we lowered the statistical threshold to an
uncorrected p < 0.01. We explored whether a positive interaction existed between level of
selection and task; that is, if the process of action selection elicited greater brain activity
than command following when the action was executed versus imagined. No significant
effects were found for the positive interaction at an acceptable statistical threshold, nor
when thresholds were lowered to uncorrected p <0.01. We also included the inverse,
negative interaction and similarly, no significant activity was found at corrected p <0.01
at the cluster-level.
2.3.2 One-way ANOVA
There was a significant main effect of executed movement (comprising action selection,
command following and passive movement) with one very large cluster of activation
spread across several regions of the brain, including SMA, M1, S1, inferior parietal
lobule, frontal poles, and middle and superior frontal gyri, with the cluster peak located in
the right frontal lobe (x=12, y=32, z =7). The post hoc pairwise contrasts are discussed
below.
Executed movement: Action selection vs. command following
Motor execution conditions where the participant chose between two actions versus those
in which the action was determined by the experimenter revealed a large cluster of
activity in the right paracingulate gyrus (including pre-SMA) that extended into the left
hemisphere. Activity was also seen in the right angular and supramarginal gyri. This
pattern of activity is similar to that observed when action selection was compared to
command following across motor execution and motor imagery conditions in the
Factorial Analysis. Group activations are shown in
Table 7.
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Table 7: Executed Movement: Passive vs. Active
Action Selection > Command Following
Brain structure

Coordinates
x y z
6 23 43
48 -46 55

Cluster
size (k)
1427
247

T value

Paracingulate gyrus
9.87
Inferior parietal lobule (angular
6.20
gyrus/supramarginal gyrus)
Command Following > Passive Movement
Superior temporal gyrus
63 -19 1
178
6.32
Passive Movement > Command Following
Precentral gyrus/Superior frontal gyrus -12 -16 64
6750
10.60
*Results thresholded at FWE-corrected p<0.05 for cluster level activation

p value
<0.001
0.004
0.038
<0.001

Executed movement: command following vs. passive
Motor execution conditions where the participant performed actions dictated by the
experimenter versus those in which the participant was passively moved by the
experimenter elicited significant activity in the right primary auditory cortex, with a
cluster in the left primary auditory cortex approaching significance (p = 0.065). Group
activations are shown in
Table 7.
An additional contrast exploring activity that was greater during passive movement
compared to motor execution conditions where participants followed commands revealed
a large cluster of activity over the left M1 and extending to include left S1, the superior
parietal lobule and the SMA. (See
Table 7).
Passive vs. Active Movement
We compared passive movement to all “active” executed movement (collapsed across
command following and action selection conditions). Significant activity was seen in left
sensorimotor areas including S1, M1 and the somatosensory association cortex. Another
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significant cluster of activity was seen in the left inferior frontal gyrus. A similar cluster
with almost identical coordinates that approached significance at F.W.E. (p = 0.051) was
seen in the right inferior frontal gyrus. The inverse contrast (executed movement versus
passive movement) revealed no significant activity. See Figure 5 for group activity and
Table 8 for group activations.

Passive Movement > Active Movement

Figure 5: This contrast compares brain activity during passive movement to conditions
where participants initiated movement themselves (including action selection and
command following). Results thresholded at FWE-corrected p<0.05 for cluster level
activation.
Table 8: Passive vs. Active Movement
Passive > Active Movement (Action Selection + Command Following)
Brain structure
Coordinates
Cluster
T value
x y z
size (k)
Postcentral/Precentral gyrus, Superior
-33 -34 61
7063
14.16
parietal lobule
Inferior frontal gyrus
-54 8 13
172
5.73
*Results thresholded at FWE-corrected p<0.05 for cluster level activation

p value
<0.001
0.046

Passive vs. rest
The passive movement condition produced robust activity in several brain regions when
compared to rest, such as M1 and S1, as well as parietal regions including the
somatosensory association cortex and secondary somatosensory cortex (S2) as shown in
Figure 6. Significant activity was also found in frontal areas including the right inferior
frontal gyrus and left central opercular cortex, as well as bilateral extrastriate visual
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cortex (lateral occipital cortex) and auditory association area (middle temporal gyrus). A
complete list of significant activations is shown in Table 9.

Passive Movement > Rest

Figure 6: This contrast compares brain activity during passive movement compared to
rest conditions. Results thresholded at FWE-corrected p<0.05 for cluster level activation.
Table 9: Passive Movement vs. Rest
Brain structure

Passive > rest
Coordinates
x y z
-33 -28 64
66 -25 25
57 17 16
-54 -64 4

Cluster
size (k)
3123
1287
369
203

T value

Postcentral/Precentral gyrus
11.65
Supramarginal gyrus
9.79
Inferior frontal gyrus
9.73
Lateral occipital cortex/Middle
9.68
temporal gyrus
Central opercular cortex
-48 2 7
219
7.92
*Results thresholded at FWE-corrected p<0.05 for cluster level activation

p value
<0.001
<0.001
0.003
0.027
0.021
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Chapter 3: General Discussion
3.0 Discussion
Here, we provide the first report of the differences in brain activity elicited by command
following and the level of response selection necessary for binary communication, in
tasks involving either external behavioural responses (i.e. motor execution) or covert
neural responses (i.e motor imagery). Our results provide evidence to support that, while
motor imagery and execution may be dissociable processes, the mechanisms underlying
the ability to select between two actions are not dependent on how the motor response is
expressed (i.e. executed or imagined). Furthermore, we found that passive and active
movement share very similar patterns of neural activity, particularly in sensorimotor
regions, but seem to recruit different frontal brain areas.
3.1 Validation of the Motor Task
The motor imagery and execution tasks produced similar activation patterns as previous
neuroimaging experiments (Michelon et al. 2006; Mokienko et al. 2013; Gerardin et al.
2000). Specifically, motor imagery compared to rest elicited activity in frontal regions,
including the SMA, similar to the well-established “tennis” motor imagery paradigm used
in our lab (Fernández-Espejo et al. 2014; Boly et al. 2007). Motor execution compared to
rest activated contralateral M1 and ipsilateral cerebellum, an activation pattern typically
reported in neuroimaging studies of executed movement (Machado et al. 2013;
Formaggio et al. 2013).
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3.2 Action Selection, compared to Command Following recruits a fronto-parietal
network
Both behavioural and neuroimaging studies agree in suggesting that most VS or MCS
patients who are overtly or covertly able to follow commands do not show
communication abilities (Estraneo et al. 2014; Monti et al. 2010; Naci & Owen 2013;
Owen 2011), but the neural correlates behind this divergence are not well understood. We
found significantly higher activity in frontal regions, including the pre-SMA, and middle
frontal gyrus when participants had to select between two possible actions (pre-requisite
for binary communication) compared to when the examiner dictated their actions to them
(command following). The middle frontal gyrus (Wiese et al. 2004) and pre-SMA
(Mostofsky & Simmonds 2008; Haggard 2008) are thought to be involved with higher
order executive functions related to voluntary motor control. The peak in the cluster of
activation in the left middle frontal gyrus was located in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC). Activity in this region was reported in several PET studies (Jahanshahi et al.
1995; Jenkins et al. 2000; Weeks et al. 2001) comparing externally-triggered movements
(eg. cued by an auditory or visual stimulus) and self-initiated movements (eg. self-paced
by the participant). In Weeks et al.’s study, participants also chose between two possible
finger movements to perform. DLPFC involvement is thought to reflect the increased
demand on working memory in the self-initiated condition, where participants must keep
track of their own movements’ timing rather than simply responding to cues (Weeks et al.
2001). In our experiment, participants determined the type, rather than the timing, of their
movements in the action selection condition. They were instructed that the six-movement
sequences they created during these blocks should be novel, and should not include more
than three repetitions of the same movement (eg. slide). Therefore, it is not surprising that
action selection elicited greater activity in the DLPFC, as participants likely held their
selected movements in working memory to create their sequences.
Activity in pre-SMA has previously been observed in motor experiments where
participants were asked to control certain aspects of the movements they performed, such
as direction, timing, or type (Jahanshahi et al. 1995; Deiber et al. 1999; Jenkins et al.
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2000; Jankelowitz & Colebatch 2002; Gowen & Miall 2007). In a 2008 review, Haggard
proposed that voluntary action is a form of decision-making (Haggard 2008) that involves
two decisions: whether to act, and what to do. The latter is further broken down into
choosing between a goal (or task), and selecting between possible movements to achieve
it. Regions within the pre-SMA are activated when participants choose between different
tasks (eg. following a specific, cued movement plan or making their own movement plan)
as well as quickly switching between these two tasks (Nachev et al. 2005). The pre-SMA
is thought to help form and initiate action intentions (eg. which task to do) by forwarding
inputs from the basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex to the SMA and M1 (Nachev et al.
2007; Haggard 2008). Activity in the pre-SMA increases when participants are asked to
specifically pay attention to their intention to move during tasks with self-paced
movements (Lau et al. 2004). Prefrontal areas including the pre-SMA are also thought to
influence action selection by preferentially enhancing a particular desired action among
several alternatives represented in the parietal cortex (Cisek & Kalaska 2010).
Importantly, all of the above studies involved decision-making with executed
movements, although Haggard suggests that the same process of voluntary action
preparation occurs for actions that are prepared but not executed. In his 2007 fMRI study,
participants chose when to make simple key presses and in some cases, when to prepare
to key-press but not perform the action at the last moment (Brass & Haggard 2007).
While cancelling a planned movement and motor imagery are not identical mental
processes, our results indicate that the pre-SMA is also recruited when decisions about
imagined movements are made, as in the condition where participants selected between
imagining two action alternatives.
Additionally, in our study action selection elicited activity in the left insula. The insula
has been associated with self-awareness, specifically in relation to the body and its
movements (Tsakiris et al. 2007). In particular, several neuroimaging studies have
implicated the insula in the sense of agency or personal authorship of voluntary
movements, although the specific location of activity varies from right posterior (Farrer
et al. 2003) to bilateral anterior (Farrer & Frith 2002). Finally, action selection compared
to command following also revealed significant activation in the somatosensory
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association cortex, specifically the left supramarginal and right angular gyri. This is in
agreement with a 2004 fMRI study by Wiese and colleagues, who found increased
activation in the left inferior parietal lobe when subjects self-initiated finger movements,
compared to when these movements were performed in response to visual cues.
The right angular gyrus has also been associated with awareness of action authorship,
specifically, in matching our movement intentions to their outcomes to determine
whether a movement is under our control or another’s (Farrer et al. 2008). In Farrer’s
studies, increased right angular gyrus activity corresponded to an increased mismatch
between action intention and outcome, which contributed to the sense that the participant
did not perform the actions. In contrast, our results show increased activity in this region
in the condition where participants had greater control over their movements (action
selection). Important methodological differences could account for this discreprency in
findings; Farrer’s experiments involved manipulating the perceived outcomes of
participants’ actions (through modifying visual feedback displays of the consequences of
their movements) as well as directly asking participants to evaluate their sense of action
authorship. In our experiment, participants kept their eyes closed in the scanner and
received no feedback, auditory or visual, regarding their movements other than their own
proprioception. Furthermore, they were not asked about their personal experience of
agency throughout the different movement conditions, as that was not the focus of our
study.
More generally, the activity seen in the inferior parietal lobule may reflect a
complimentary motor-decision pathway to the more frontal-system described above.
Some action related decisions, such as choosing between movement alternatives, are
thought to use a parietal brain circuit that involves sensory feedback relayed from
primary sensory areas to the parietal cortex, and then to premotor areas and M1 (Haggard
2008). Cisek & Kalaska proposed that this “dorsal” system originally evolved to allow
organisms to react to their environment (eg. reaching for a moving object), and has since
been adapted to participate in more complex decision-making, beyond those involving
visually guided movements (Cisek & Kalaska 2010). Both the frontal and parietal areas
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activated when participants choose their own actions, compared to when their actions
were dictated to them, correspond to neuroanatomical models of decision-making
(Gleichgerrcht et al. 2010).
Overall, the above results suggest that selection between two possible actions requires a
greater involvement of high-level associative areas in frontal and parietal cortices than
required for following simple commands.
3.3 Response Modality: Differences in Executed versus Imagined Movements
Motor imagery involves creating an internal mental representation of an overt action
without any concurrent executed movement (Jeannerod 1995). In contrast, motor
execution involves physically performing a movement. Classic neuroimaging studies
revealed similar patterns of brain activity for both motor imagery and execution (Porro et
al. 1996; Lotze & Halsband 2006). This led some authors to conclude they may be
equivalent processes (Jeannerod 1995; Stephan et al. 1995). However, more recent works
have revealed important differences in functional brain activation and connectivity
between the two (James M. Kilner et al. 2004; Carrillo-de-la-Peña et al. 2008; Xu et al.
2014; Burianová et al. 2013; Machado et al. 2013). Consistent with these reports, we
identified higher activation in left sensorimotor areas, including M1, S1 and the superior
parietal lobule, as well as the right cerebellum for motor execution, as compared to motor
imagery. In contrast, motor imagery was associated with higher activity in the right M1,
S1, and left inferior frontal gyrus. The higher ipsilateral M1/S1 activity in this contrast
may be reflecting inhibition during motor execution. Indeed, concurrent left M1
activation and right M1 deactivation has been previously reported in both EEG and fMRI
studies involving right hand movement (Burke et al. 2004; Hayashi et al. 2008; Grefkes
et al. 2008; Machado et al. 2013). The reported activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus
has previously been seen in motor imagery studies (Gerardin et al. 2000; Szameitat et al.
2012), and further suggests an inhibitory process during motor imagery. The inferior
frontal gyrus, specifically the right side, is associated with response inhibition in go/nogo and stop-signal tasks that require rapid inhibition of motor responses (Aron et al.
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2004). Recently, some controversy regarding the exact role of the right IFG in this
inhibitory mechanism has arisen (Hampshire 2015), with some researchers believing it
helps orient attention to stop signals (Solbakk et al. 2014; Sharp et al. 2010), or keep
track of arbitrary task rules dictating when to inhibit responses (Mostofsky & Simmonds
2008). Overall, studies increasingly suggest that the IFG works together with other
frontal areas, including the pre-SMA (Sharp et al. 2010; Mostofsky & Simmonds 2008)
and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Mostofsky et al. 2003) to inhibit responses.
3.4 A lack of interaction between response and modality
One aim of our study was to investigate whether the differences between command
following and action selection for communication are dependent on the modality in
which the participant expresses their response (i.e. imagining or execution). Here, we
failed to identify an interaction between modality (i.e. motor imagery and execution) and
level of selection, even at very low statistical thresholds. A specific contrast exploring the
possibility of a positive interaction, whether action selection elicited greater brain activity
than command following in motor execution versus motor imagery conditions, also
revealed no significant activity, even at uncorrected p<0.01. Overall, our results do not
provide evidence for an interaction between the cognitive resources required to make a
response and the specific method (motor execution or imagery) employed. This may
suggest that these two factors are dissociable, that is, the neural processes involved in
following a command or selecting an action are not dependent on the modality in which
the action is expressed. Therefore, it could theoretically be possible to express preserved
cognitive abilities with one modality and not the other. This finding has special
significance for DOC patients who cannot exhibit behavioural signs of awareness, but are
capable of demonstrating covert awareness by modulating their brain activity.
3.5 Passive Movement elicits similar brain activity to executed movement
Another aim of this study was to characterize brain activity in response to passive
movement, and compare it to volitionally executed movement to explore the existence of
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a movement-decision hierarchy. Passive movement compared to rest elicited activity in
left S1 and M1, as well as the right somatosensory association cortex, including S2 and
the supramarginal gyrus. Activation in these areas is commonly seen in neuroimaging
studies involving passive arm (Yu et al, 2011; Estevez et al, 2014), foot (Francis et al,
2009; Ciccarelli et al, 2006), and finger movements (Alary et al, 1998; Van de Winckel et
al 2013). Activity was also seen in the left inferior frontal gyrus and the right central
opercular cortex. Involvement of the inferior frontal gyrus may reflect the same inhibition
of movement described previously for motor imagery conditions (see Section 3.3 above).
Similar to motor imagery, participants were instructed not to move during passive
conditions, but to keep their limbs completely relaxed as researchers moved them. The
activity seen in the opercular cortex may reflect the somatosensory stimulation associated
with the strap used to move participants’ arms. Opercular cortex specifically has been
activated following electrical stimulation of the median nerve, a technique used to elicit
somatosensation in participants (Korvenoja et al, 1999). Interestingly, the passive
condition compared to rest showed no activity in the pre-SMA, one of the brain areas
involved with increased decision-making and autonomy during voluntary movement and
motor planning (Lau et al. 2004; Haggard 2008; Gowen & Miall 2007; Jenkins et al.
2000; Nachev et al. 2005). This is not surprising, as participants did not have to choose to
perform an action in response to command, or select among alternative actions to
perform. In fact, participants had no control over their arm movements in this condition,
and made no decision other than the choice to comply with researchers and remain
relaxed during passive movement. However, the difference in pre-SMA activity between
passive and active movement did not survive the statistical threshold when the two
conditions were compared directly.
To further investigate brain activity in executed movement requiring varying degrees of
decision making by the participant, we performed a One-Way ANOVA with three levels:
action selection, command following, and passive movement. The contrast comparing
conditions where participants selected and performed their own actions compared to
command following conditions revealed brain activity similar to what was found
previously in the factorial analysis described above. The contrast comparing command
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following movements to passive movements revealed significant activity only in the
primary auditory cortex. This is likely because participants heard auditory instructions
(eg. “lift”, “slide”) in command following blocks, compared to silence during passive
movement. Similarly, when we directly compared conditions where participants actively
moved themselves (command following combined with action selection) to passive
movement, no significant activity in any brain area was found.
Surprisingly, the inverse contrast (passive movement compared to active movement)
revealed several regions of activity. Significant activation of the left inferior frontal
gyrus, with a corresponding cluster in the right inferior frontal gyrus narrowly missing
the significance cut-off at FWE corrected p = 0.051, could represent motor inhibition that
is not required during conditions with actively executed movements (Jaeger et al. 2014).
A large cluster of activity in contralateral S1 and somatosensory association cortex, as
well as M1, was also seen. Similar activation in sensorimotor regions was seen when
passive movement was compared to movement execution from the command following
condition only.
The finding that passive movement elicited greater sensorimotor activity than active
movement was unexpected. Neuroimaging studies comparing active movements
performed by a participant to passive movements made by experimenters typically find
stronger activation in sensorimotor areas during active movement (Yu et al, 2011;
Estevez et al, 2014; Ciccarelli et al 2006; Van de Winckel et al 2013). Greater activation
in the motor cortex is assumed to reflect its increased involvement when the participant
plans and executes a movement themselves. Similarly, we might also expect to see more
activity in frontal areas associated with movement decisions, such as the pre-SMA, when
a participant actively performs a movement compared to passive conditions. In this
experiment, pre-SMA involvement seems to be restricted to action selection conditions
involving the highest level of decision-making, and therefore activity in this region is not
observed when comparing combined forms of active movement, or solely command
following, to passive movement. Alternately, a recent neuroimaging study comparing
active and robot-assisted passive leg movements found greater activity in somatosensory
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association areas (inferior parietal cortex) and premotor cortex, as well as frontal areas
including medial frontal gyrus, anterior and posterior cingulate gyri, and even pre-SMA
(Jaeger et al. 2014). The authors attribute the increased frontal activity to the participants’
efforts to keep their limbs passive and inhibit active motor responses during the passive
condition of their task. Furthermore, some neuroimaging studies involving hand
movements do report similar a strength of activation between passive and active
movement, with greater activity in only small regions in left M1 and S1 during active
movement (Szameitat et al. 2012) or activity that is similar in strength and even more
localized in passive movement (Formaggio et al. 2013). However, the significant and
widespread sensorimotor activation seen in passive compared to active movement in our
experiment is not consistent with the literature. Further experiments would be needed to
determine exactly why sensorimotor activity was greater in passive compared to active
movements. It is possible the sensory feedback from the Velcro strap around the
participants’ wrist, which was used by experimenters to move their arm, could contribute
to the increased activity in somatosensory areas. However, this would not account for the
increased activity seen in M1. One possibility is that the experimenter-lead passive
movements were greater in range and magnitude then the movements actively performed
by the participants. In 2011, an fMRI study by Yu and colleagues reported reduced brain
activity when healthy volunteers made movements with less force than previous
movements, as measured by a robotic manipulandum (Yu et al. 2011). Video recordings
of the task did not reveal perceptively large variations between passive and active
movements, although an automated mechanism to measure movement velocity, force and
range would be required to accurately assess variations between movements. Inclusion of
an MR compatible robotic or mechanical device to control passive movement, in place of
an experimenter, would be useful in future experiments directly comparing active and
passive movements. With our current experimental design, we cannot discount the
possibility that participants unintentionally resisted or assisted the passive movement,
despite instructions to remain completely relaxed. Such uninstructed movement could
possibly explain the increased M1 involvement. Future neuroimaging experiments could
use electromyography (EMG) to record participants’ biceps brachii muscle activity
during active and passive movement tasks. This would help identify whether participants
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are actively engaging their arm muscles during passive movement conditions (Francis et
al. 2009).

3.6 Implications for DOC Patients
Overall, the results from the fMRI paradigm in healthy participants indicate that selection
between two possible actions requires a greater involvement of high-level associative
areas in frontal and parietal cortices than required for following simple commands.
Interestingly, seminal post-mortem neuropathological studies identified the presence of
fronto-temporal contusions and white matter damage in most patients with a diagnosis of
VS at the time of death (Kampfl et al. 1998; Maxwell et al. 2010). Kampfl et al analyzed
structural MRI scans of 42 VS patients and found cortical contusions, most commonly in
the frontal and temporal lobes, in almost half of patients. White matter damage in the
frontal lobes (as well as temporal lobes and corona radiata) was reported in 65% of
patients (Kampfl et al. 1998). A quantitative histopathological study on 48 brain-injured
patients, classified as moderately disabled, severely disabled and VS, examined neuronal
cell loss in the prefrontal, anterior cingulate and motor cortices. They found that the
extent of neuronal cell loss was most pronounced in prefrontal regions, and that greater
neuronal cell loss corresponded to diagnoses with more severe impairment (Maxwell et
al. 2010).
Crucially, more recent structural and functional connectivity studies have revealed
marked impairments in associative fronto-parietal areas in VS and MCS patients
(Fernández-Espejo et al. 2012; Laureys et al. 1999; Laureys 2005; Juengling et al. 2005;
Levine & Levine 2008). Importantly, this damage appeared to correlate with the
complexity of the behaviors the patients were able to exhibit (Fernández-Espejo et al.
2012). Although neuropathological changes related to command following and
communication have not explicitly been assessed in these studies, it seems reasonable to
hypothesize that disruptions in these long-range fronto-parietal networks may explain
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why most command following patients have difficulty with the higher decision-making
demands associated with communicating with their responses. Future studies directly
comparing brain damage in patients who can command follow versus those who can
communicate will help to characterize any specific structural damage that may underlie
this cognitive distinction.
Another aim of our study was to investigate whether the differences between command
following and action selection are dependent on the modality in which the responses are
expressed. In our experiment, the modality could be behavioural (motor execution) or
mental (motor imagery). A large number of studies have reported covert command
following and / or communication in patients who are entirely non-behavioural (Cruse et
al. 2011; Goldfine et al. 2012; D. Cruse et al. 2012; Gibson et al. 2014; Coyle D, Stow J,
McCreadie K, McElligott J, Carroll A 2014; Owen et al. 2006; Monti et al. 2010;
Fernández-Espejo & Owen 2013; Forgacs et al. 2014; Schnakers et al. 2008; Lulé et al.
2013; Pan et al. 2014; Naci & Owen 2013; Monti et al. 2014; Bekinschtein et al. 2011;
Bardin et al. 2011). However, some reports suggest that the opposite discrepancy
between bedside and neuroimaging capabilities may also exist. For instance, Bardin and
colleagues (2011) reported two brain injured patients, from a cohort of seven, who were
capable of command following or communication in behavioural assessments but not in
neuroimaging paradigms. They proposed that motor imagery requires the same cognitive
resources (eg. working memory, task maintenance) that are needed to successfully
communicate, and this creates a “resource allocation” problem in brain injured patients.
That is, their ability to successfully perform both tasks simultaneously is impaired
because the shared cognitive resources required are likely reduced in patients compared
to healthy individuals (Bardin et al. 2011). Furthermore, some patients may demonstrate
command following using one neuroimaging technique but not the other (Gibson,
Fernandez-Espejo, et al., 2014).
Our experiment failed to identify an interaction, even at very low thresholds, between
modality and level of selection, suggesting that these two factors may be dissociable.
This finding is especially relevant for DOC patients, because it implies that the neural
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mechanisms associated with command following and action selection are not dependent
on whether the response is overt (motor behavior) or covert (motor imagery). This further
supports the hypothesis that a lack of overt behavioural responses does not preclude the
existence of preserved cognitive abilities indicative of consciousness in VS patients
(Monti et al. 2010). The above discrepancies may then simply represent the well-known
false-negatives in neuroimaging paradigms. The prevalence of false negative results in
VS patients is difficult to estimate, because of the lack of a reliable “gold-standard”
clinical measure to confirm whether a patient is conscious or not (Peterson et al. 2013).
However, it is well known that a small proportion (15%) of conscious, healthy volunteers
fail to show reliable appropriate brain activity in motor imagery paradigms (FernándezEspejo et al. 2014; Cruse et al. 2011; Hampshire et al. 2013). Furthermore, abnormal or
absent brain activity in these patients could result from multiple other factors, including
their unique brain damage and arousal levels, as well as limitations with the
neuroimaging technique used (eg. excessive motion artifacts).
This finding provides further support for the use of motor imagery fMRI tasks as a
reliable proxy for overt command following and communication in brain-injured patients.
A patient who can communicate by selecting between two mental responses in an fMRI
scanner could potentially demonstrate the same level of conscious awareness as a patient
communicating via behavioural responses at the bedside.
3.7 Passive Movement: Applications for DOC Patients
The passive movement condition in our task revealed a very similar pattern of neural
activity to active movement, and these similarities centered mainly around sensorimotor
regions. By contrast, frontal regions were recruited differently in passive and active
movement, although these differences did not appear when the two were directly
compared. Surprisingly, passive movement elicited brain activation equal to or greater
than active movement. Further studies, with more precise monitoring of passive
movements and any incidental muscle activity, are required to investigate this unexpected
finding. In either case, our results suggest that passively moving a participant’s arm can
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produce robust brain activity in the fMRI, providing a healthy baseline of activity for
comparison with future passive movement experiments in DOC patients. Because passive
tasks do not require effortful response from the patient, they can be performed in a wider
group of patients, including comatose patients, who can neither move nor imagine
moving to command. The intensity and extent of brain activity induced by somatosensory
signals associated with passive movement could potentially indicate the functional
preservation of a patient’s sensorimotor pathways, which may complement prognostic
information obtained in SSEP studies
To our knowledge, only one study has examined brain activity associated with passive
movement in DOC patients. In a recent experiment by Horki et al., researchers used EEG
to study attempted, imagined and passive movements in six MCS patients (Horki et al.
2014). In the motor imagery condition, patients were asked to imagine playing their
favourite sport, while in the attempted movement condition, patients were instructed to
try to dorsiflex their foot at the ankle. The passive condition was performed in only one
patient, and involved a caregiver dorsiflexing the patient’s ankle. One of the researchers’
aims was to explore whether passive movement could be used to setup an initial classifier
in a motor-based BCI, based on the similar sensorimotor activation seen in passive and
active movement (Horki et al. 2014). Passive movement in the single patient tested could
not be classified successfully above chance, however, the authors did report task-related
changes in activity over sensorimotor related brain areas. Furthermore, they noted that
when attempted foot movements followed passive foot movement, classification of EEG
activity associated with these attempted movements was very accurate (Horki et al 2014).
The potential for passive or observed (Pistoia et al. 2013) movements to improve motor
functioning in patients requires further investigation. Many DOC patients receive some
form of physical therapy as part of their clinical care. This therapy is primarily designed
to prevent muscle atrophy, although it may be possible that the passive movement could
stimulate a patient’s preserved motor pathways as well. Passive movement could also
possibly serve as an indicator of prognosis for brain-injured patients in the acute stage.
The absence of somatosensory evoked potentials (SSEPs) elicited by physically
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stimulating the hand of coma patients is used clinically as an indicator of poor outcome
(Gofton et al. 2009). It is possible that the presence of sensorimotor activity in response
to passive movement may have some positive predictive ability in coma patients with an
intact SSEP response. Passive movement is an intriguing topic that requires further
exploration in this population, especially considering the frequency of motor impairments
(Lapitskaya et al. 2013a) and the clinical importance of motor responses for
demonstrating conscious awareness (Steven Laureys et al. 2004).
3.8 Conclusion
Our results provide neural evidence that action selection necessary for binary
communication involves greater activity in higher associative areas in frontal and parietal
regions than command following. This supports an important finding of clinical
assessments in DOC patients; that communication involves higher-order cognition than
simply responding to a command. We also demonstrated that the cognitive process
behind selecting an action may be dissociable from the process of expressing it (through
motor execution or imagery). Therefore, a patient may retain the cognitive ability to
choose between two actions regardless of whether their ability to overtly execute actions
is preserved or impaired. This result thus provides further support for the use of covert
assessments of command following and communication as a feasible proxy for traditional
bedside behavioural assessments. Finally, the establishment of healthy baseline data for
neural responses to passive movement lays the foundation for future passive experiments
exploring preserved sensorimotor function in these patients.
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Appendix I
For all analyses in this thesis, the FSL Harvard-Oxford Cortical and Subcortical
Structural Atlases were used for anatomical identification, which can be found at this link
http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/Atlases. The authors of the atlas have asked for the
following statement to be included when acknowledging the atlas: We are very grateful
for the training data for FIRST, particularly to David Kennedy at the CMA, and also to:
Christian Haselgrove, Centre for Morphometric Analysis, Harvard; Bruce Fischl,
Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, MGH; Janis Breeze and Jean Frazier, Child and
Adolescent Neuropsychiatric Research Program, Cambridge Health Alliance; Larry
Seidman and Jill Goldstein, Department of Psychiatry of Harvard Medical School; Barry
Kosofsky, Weill Cornell Medical Center.
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